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**EU crisis management in Africa.
The time for a “real adventure”
has come**

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While demand for international crisis management forces continues to increase rapidly, the EU is still falling well short of its declared ambition in playing a major role in global security and in the promotion of peace and stability. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) stresses that the Union “must be ready to shape events and develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention ... and it should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously”.¹ Ten years of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), under which the Union conducts civil and military crisis management operations, have given the Union the opportunity to assume a more prominent role in global crisis management, including detailed military-technical procedures and a political strategic-framework to guide actions. However, and as a matter of fact, the military operations launched outside Europe deployed in the African continent played a crucial role to highlight the discrepancies between the EU’s ambitions on a global scale and the limitation of what it is capable to do. In 2003, in 2006, and subsequently in 2008, the EU forces were requested by the UN to intervene in the conflict situations in the DRC and in Chad/RCA for limited periods of time. In 2003, the Council implied the EU was capable of conducting “some crisis management” missions across the whole Petersberg spectrum², covering humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks, while conceding that the ESDP was limited by significant capabilities shortfalls. Giving green light to the EU forces, in 2003 the mission Operation Artemis, was deployed in the DR Congo followed by other two missions: the EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 and the EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008-2009. Even though, these missions demonstrated that the EU can successfully carry out military operations outside Europe and achieve “limited success”, they also provided a clear understanding of the EU’s aspirations and the problems it faces in relation to force generation, capabilities, and political will among EU Member States. The reality is that these missions can not serve as a model case for future EU missions causes as the Union is not yet capable to provide such capacities.

The EU-AU cooperation: a failed partnership?

The EU is working more closely with regional organizations, in particular with the African Union (AU). To this end, the EU has put major emphasis in defining better its foreign development and security policy goals for the African continent. These have been adopted through a number of

¹ Report on the Implementation of the European Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World - 11 December 2008. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf>

² The “Petersberg Tasks” had been defined by the Council of the WEU at a meeting in Petersberg. Part II, point 4 of the Petersberg Declarations of 19 June 1992 says: “Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacekeeping”.

key policy documents: the European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003³; two Common Positions on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa (2004, 2005)⁴; the Action Plan for support to Peace and Security in Africa⁵; the Strategy for Africa, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy⁶ and lastly, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2008⁷. It is worthwhile to note that in the ESS 2003, the regional conflicts on the African continent were perceived as “less visible and less predictable” threats that menaced the European interests “directly and indirectly”. Whereas in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS from December 2008, the African conflicts are no longer perceived as key threats, but as more “manageable environments” in which the EU is committed to enhance the “African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning”⁸.

But, how much have the recent developments improved “the bilateral military support” between the EU and the AU? The Joint Africa-EU Strategy reaffirms the EU support to the AU guided by the principle of “African ownership”, its commitment to provide the necessary capacity building to the African Peace Facility (APF) through the EU crisis management instruments and other programs through bilateral Member States’ support.⁹ One of the long-term goals of this partnership is to have African peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building mechanisms in place capable to take over any crisis management in the region. Despite all the aforementioned efforts to improve expertise and experience, during the EU missions in Africa, the AU was not able to take part in any of the missions. A clear prove is the mission in Chad, which started in 2008 – 6 years after the AU was formed – and yet, the EU troops were not able to count on the African forces. It seems that a change on the *status quo* is unlikely to happen, at least in the medium-run. The EU is aware of the weaknesses on its military missions – particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance. Therefore, relying on regional forces that can give a considerable input to the EU missions on the ground is indispensable to successfully conduct operations. The engagement of the EU forces in these military operations gave the Union the opportunity to prove its willingness and its readiness to act in crisis situations without the support of NATO or the AU forces. But at the same time, the limited successes obtained in these short-term operations gave the EU good feelings of self-confidence impeding Europeans to properly

³ European Security Strategy - Brussels, 12 December 2003. <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>>

⁴ Common Positions on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa 2005/304/CFSP - 12 April 2005. <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:097:0057:0062:EN:PDF>>

⁵ Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership. <http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/peace-and-security/africa-eu-peace-security-partnership_en.cfm>

⁶ Joint Africa-EU Strategy. <http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-BF42-4CB3-B566-407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_formatado.pdf>

⁷ Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Brussels, 11 December 2008. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf>

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹ Joint Africa-EU Strategy, p. 5.

learn from previous lessons and best practices, as it will be proven in all three military operations run in Africa. This situation is making the EU to become victim of its own success. The more military missions Europe runs, the more exposed its military weaknesses become. There is a high risk that the false sense of security could leave the EU contingents unprepared to effectively respond to true challenging crisis situations.

Operation Artemis

This mission was the first military engagement in which the EU would have been able to demonstrate its ability to conduct an autonomous operation beyond the European continent and in a very demanding environment. The operation, meant to restore order and to stop the massacres in Bunia, was launched on 12 June 2003, following the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003¹⁰. France was the first country to respond, but it offered personnel on the condition that the mission would have a robust mandate (Chapter VII of the UN Charter), be welcome by the countries in the region, and be limited in time and scope.¹¹ Since the mission had clear limits on the key parameters of size, duration, and responsibilities, the mission became attractive to many EU members. The contingent Artemis was commanded by France (serving as a framework nation), but the personnel came from Belgium, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the non EU-state members of Brazil, Canada, and South Africa.¹² All in all, there were 1,400 troops, half of which were French paratroopers.¹³ The mission mandate had to protect refugee camps and housing internally displaced persons as well as to secure the airport of Bunia (the capital of Itura – a region where hostilities were severe), and guarantee the safety of the civilian population and international personnel in the city of Bunia. Operation Artemis was a reinforcement to the UN forces (MONUC) already deployed in the DRC, which needed additional military support in order to move to a peace process forward despite continuing violence in the region.

Operation Artemis was symbolically an important mission because it was the first mission to be conducted beyond the European continent and without the NATO support. The operation was able to restore order in the town of Bunia and to secure the airport, which allowed the UN troops (MONUC) to take over the mission. These achievements certainly helped to strengthen the internal EU confidence building. At the same time, a number of shortcomings could be spotted. First of all, the mission was basically a French operation as it was “the only country to have men engaged in direct

¹⁰ The deployment of the EU troops would “contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps of Bunia and if, the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town”. SC Resolution 1484 (2003). <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/UNresolution1484.pdf>>

¹¹ Grignon F., *The Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Lessons for the future of EU Peace-keeping in Africa*, p. 2. <http://www.ieei.pt/files/Paper_FGrignon.pdf>

¹² Opérations de paix, *Artémis Force internationale de maintien de la paix en Ituri*. <<http://www.operationspaix.net/-Artemis->

¹³ Orders of Battle, *Operation Artemis* <http://orbat.com/site/agtwerpen/france_opartremis2003_3.pdf>

military operations on the ground...and provided the headquarters for operational planning”.¹⁴ Second, the mission’s contribution to the saving of lives in Ituri was minimal. Only few kilometers outside Bunia large scale massacres continued – the mandate was confined “only” to Bunia. Third, the mission did not become an EU operation because of African related considerations, but because this was an opportunity for the EU to prove its skills on operational planning and the mobilization of troops in a short period of time. More importantly, it is too easy to forget that only EU countries that have the operational capacity to become “framework nations” are France, UK and maybe Germany. And thus, if these nations do not take the lead, there would be no EU capacity to intervene in such conflicts.¹⁵ Fourth, these missions are very costly and countries that decide to take part of EU missions have to pay for their own costs. This is the main reason, why Operation Artemis had such a limited timeframe of three months: France was not able to afford a longer or stronger mission. All in all it can be said that the mission did perform according to its mandate, but the broader view for securing peace and stability in the region made only little steps forward and the impact on the region was largely a short-term one.

EUFOR RD Congo

In April 2006, following the UN Resolution 1671 and the Council’s adoption of a Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP¹⁶, the EU deployed a new military mission in Congo to assist MONUC troops during the first free Congolese presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 July of the same year. The tasks for this new mission were to support MONUC to stabilize the situation; to protect the civilians under immediate threat and the airport in Kinshasa; to secure freedom of movement of the personnel; and to extract individuals in danger.¹⁷ 21 EU Member States, Turkey, and Switzerland contributed to the operation, which involved around 2,300 troops. The four largest contingents came from France (1,090), Germany (730), Poland (130), and Spain (130).¹⁸ This time, Germany was the leading nation for this mission with an operational headquarters in Potsdam, Germany and a force headquarters in Congo run by a French company. The operation was launched on 12 June 2006 and concluded on 30 November 2006.

EUFOR RD Congo was able to fulfill its tasks stated in the UN mandate, especially in one particular event in which, an effective joint action between the EU and UN troops succeeded to

¹⁴ Grignon F., *The Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Lessons for the future of EU Peace-keeping in Africa*, p. 1. <http://www.ieei.pt/files/Paper_FGrignon.pdf>

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶ Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP

<<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:116:0098:0101:EN:PDF>>

¹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1671, 25 April 2006. <<http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/3999.pdf>>

¹⁸ Ehrhart H.G., *EUFOR RD Congo: a preliminary assessment*, European Security Review no 32, March 2007, p. 9. <http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_esr_46_esr32final.pdf>

rescue some diplomats trapped in the middle of a fire fighting.¹⁹ One aspect that helped the EU troops to fulfill its goals was that they were not supposed to lead Congo towards democracy, but only to provide assistance to the UN troops in conducting the elections and deterring those individuals who wanted to disrupt the process. Moreover, the EUFOR's mission was deployed around Kinshasa and not in the more dangerous eastern regions of the country and with a very restricted mission of only four months. As seen in Operation Artemis, the EUFOR mission revealed, the same way, how difficult was to obtain commitments for crucial assets and capabilities from Member States. As a matter of fact, “it took two weeks to close a gap in EUFOR's medical team: two surgeons were needed”.²⁰ There were also political problems prior to, and during, the operation that suggested certain difficulties in the Franco-German relations. Both countries continuously disagreed on “rapid reactions”, on deployment of troops, and on the duration of the entire operation since the Germany's defense minister Franz-Josef Jung promised German troops their return to Germany for Christmas of the same year.²¹ EUFOR pursued a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy and somehow convinced the Congolese public that its presence in the region was purely to support the UN troops. However, a main point of criticism was that the primarily reason for countries such as France and Belgium to engage in these kind of missions was to secure their influence on the regional government and to pursue their own economic interests. As one colonel stated, “Sometimes it feels as if we were conducting missions to satisfy our consciences rather than achieve a certain effect on the ground”.²² Certainly, the intentions to “instrumentalize” the EU mission pose a problem to the ESDP because other nations will be reluctant to contribute to future military missions. It can be said that all in all, the EUFOR RD Congo was characterized by a delicate tightrope walk between political objectives and constraints on one side, and military requirements on the other side.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA

In January 2008, the European Union launched its largest and most ambitious military mission in Africa – EUFOR Tchad/RCA following the UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007)²³, which set up UNAMID (a joint UN-AU force), the report of 10 August 2007 (S/2007/488)²⁴, in which the UN formally proposed a EU military bridging operation in the region,

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁰ Giegerich B., *European Military Crisis Management. Connecting ambition and reality*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 397, p. 32.

²¹ Ehrhart H.G., *EUFOR RD Congo: a preliminary assessment*, European Security Review no 32, March 2007, p. 10. <http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_esr_46_esr32final.pdf>

²² Giegerich B., *European Military Crisis Management. Connecting ambition and reality*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 397, p. 27.

²³ UN Security Council Resolution 1769 - 31 July 2007.

<<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement>>

²⁴ Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic - 10 August 2007.

<<http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/SG%20Report%2010%20August%202007.pdf>>

and the approval of the mission by the Council of the EU on 12 September 2007²⁵. The mission of 3,700 troops coming from 14 EU countries had the mandate²⁶ to protect civilians in danger particularly refugees and internally displaced persons in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Even though, the authorities of Chad and the CAR were very reluctant to permit the entrance of the UN and the EU troops, after many talks, they allowed the “multidimensional presence” to enter in the region. The EU mission was commanded by France and the operational headquarters were situated in Mont Valérien near Paris. The operation faced problems even before its deployment. The EU had difficulties in providing the necessary means of transportation to bring soldiers and equipment to Chad. The various shortcomings culminated with India’s offer to supply the EU with fighting camels to serve as a substitute for the lack of helicopters. Little after the mission was launched the deployment of the EU forces had to be stopped because of the intense fighting, and took up again on 12 February 2008. These developments were not unanticipated; many experts knew that the situation would escalate and would bring further destabilization in Darfur, as the Austrian Armed Forces predicted in an assessment in November 2007.²⁷ Even worse, there were ongoing delays and shortfalls in the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – only one third of the expected peacekeepers were deployed in February 2008.²⁸ This certainly posed some difficulties to EUFOR as it was supposed to complement an already divided UNAMID. The EU troops found themselves almost unable to establish a secure and safe environment in a deteriorating Darfur. The huge areas of operation – an area as large as Germany – combined with severe climate and terrain conditions as well as the relative small size of limited equipped EU force challenged the military operations. While EUFOR achieved the establishment of greater security in some zones, it also created imbalances between less and more secured regions leading to further displacements.²⁹ In addition to this, since the EUFOR’s mandate did not allow activities regarding the safety of people inside the camps, security vacuums inside the refugee camps were formed, outside the camps the situation was still volatile, refugees could not return home, and the security of aid workers was increasingly threatened. Under these conditions, on 15 March 2009, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA transferred the command to the new UN forces, the MINURCAT.³⁰ All in all, this operation can be judged as the worst military operation under the EU auspicious.

²⁵ Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic. <<http://eurlex.europa.eu/doc/32007E0677.en>>

²⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1778 - 25 September 2007.

<<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/516/15/PDF/N0751615.pdf?OpenElement> >

²⁷ Bundesministerium der Landesverteidigung, Militärstrategische Weisung Nr. 2 (GZ S93304/134 Evb/2007).

²⁸ Seibert B.H., *EUFOR Tchad/RCA – A Cautionary Note*, European Security Review no 37, March 2008, p. 1.

<<http://www.aueb.gr/deos/MSc/executives/Bourantonis/The%20impact%20of%20the%20Lisbon%20Treaty.pdf>>

²⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁰ Ehrhart H.G., *Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR*, European Security Review no 42, December 2008, p. 1.

<http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_231_esr42-euforchad.pdf>

Assessing the EU ambitions and what it is capable to do

The EU's success in these relative modest and limited operations have encountered embarrassing problems such as the force generation, the lack of a real common military planning unit, the participation deficit of Member States, the misunderstandings between the EU-UN troops, the lack of political will, and most importantly, the collective amnesia of all these shortcomings that the Union keeps encountering in every military missions it launches.

Force generation problems

The EU crisis management ambitions are given by the two Headline Goals (HG 2003 and HG 2010) in which the Union set the criteria for its crisis-management missions and the various steps for its force generation³¹. The force-generation process is where the military assets and capabilities required for an EU-led military operation are designated and made available to the operations. All three missions to Africa revealed how difficult was for the EU to obtain and coordinate capabilities from Member States and to be operational effective in crisis management. In the “EU Concept for force generation”³² clear steps were drawn for the identification, activation, and deployment of the EU troops in crisis management. However, in the identification process, the EU failed to properly assess the African situation and to analyze the real roots of the conflict. Needless to say, any military operation cannot be successful without the right bases and the knowledge of the conflict. In the activation phases, the EU failed to deploy its missions in a timely manner because of the lack of coordination and equipment. Finally, in the implementation phase, the EU was able to contain the violence in the region, but only in a very limited area and with minimal effects for the entire region. It is obvious that without significant offers (contributions and commitment) from Member States, the force generation process will not be accomplished and future EU-led military operation will continue to perform as they have to date.

Lack of a real common military planning unit

The EU has a common military planning unit, which consist of a dozen of analytical employees based in the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)³³. This unit, which is called EU Staff Group, is in charge of planning the missions on a strategic and operational level. The reduced amount of analysts and policy-makers in charge of these missions cannot properly plan military operation that range from 2000 to 4000 military personnel. As a matter of fact, the undersize of this planning group, allows the staff to only focus on strategic planning and hand off the operational planning to the chosen headquarters (national staff groups). This complex arrangement allows national units to reflect their different “operational cultures” leading towards

³¹ Headline Goal 2010. <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>>

³² EU Concept for Force Generation - Brussels, 16 June 2008, p. 8.

<<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st10/st10690.en08.pdf>>

³³ SHAPE-EU Cooperation. <http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_eu/index.htm>

policies and practices that favor national interests. The patchwork of authorities for the planning and command of EU operations should be rearranged into one comprehensive and well-integrated structure “EU Operational Headquarters” (OHQ) in Brussels³⁴, under the authority of the High Representative of the EU. This OHQ should be responsible for all EU operations, both military and civilian. However, inevitable objections from pro-transatlantic states will most likely impede the creation of such unit.

Participation deficit

Member States offer military personnel on a voluntary basis. At the planning stage, they tend to contribute in principle, but the commitment tends to evaporate when military personnel are needed, especially for the fact that Member States are responsible for their own costs. Another problem is that the EU’s reservoir may not be always suitable or trained for the assigned role in missions such as Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo or EUFOR Tchad/RCA. “A competent policeman in Milan or Vienna is not necessarily adept at law enforcement in the midst of a civil war in Africa”³⁵. For this reason, many countries may be reluctant to participate because they are conscious that their personnel might not be ready for such operations. It is important that the EU dispatches the right people with the right skills to support the missions and avoid that the military troops perform tasks for which they are not properly trained.

Complementary partners?

The EU is seeking to co-operate more closely with the United Nations on international crisis management. In the ESS, the EU defines effective multilateralism as one of its strategic objectives, with the UN being a key partner³⁶. Although the UN and EU worked well together, there were some differences and misunderstandings between the two in operational command. EUFOR RD Congo could not act unless requested to do so by MONUC, which in turn had to ask to New York. The UN and the EU contingents were not able to fully engage in their tasks because of their differences in “Einsatzkulturen”³⁷ in crisis management in the region. The UN troops would engage in fire fights only in self-defense, whereas the EU troops would repeatedly engage in such fights with the local militias. Under these conditions and, in such a violent region, the EU troops were at a very high risk. If the EU troops had to engage in greater fighting with local militias, they wouldn’t have had the possibility to rely on NATO resources nor on UN troops and would have led to an inglorious withdrawal.³⁸

³⁴ Witney N., *Re-energizing Europe’s security and defense policy*, Policy Paper, The European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2008, p. 48. <http://ecfr.3cdn.net/678773462b7b6f9893_djm6vu499.pdf>

³⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁶ European Security Strategy, Part II, “Strategic Objectives”. <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>>

³⁷ Tanner F., *Richtungsmodell zukünftiger EU-Friedenseinsätze?*, Sicherheitspolitik ASMZ no 2/2004.

<http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/CM_Peacebuilding/Peace_Operations/OpEd_NewsArticles/Tanner_ASMZ.pdf>

³⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

Lack of political will

When it comes to military security, the Union presents divisions that do not reflect power differentials, but complex mixture of national and traditional attitudes. The political will to develop an EU military capability is not there. Countries like the UK believe that operational planning should be conducted under the NATO framework. However, it is hard to think of a mission where NATO would have any strategic interest to get involved in the African conflicts. The same way, the EU missions encounter bureaucratic impediments. In a large bureaucracy, such as the Union, it is easier to ignore one's share of responsibility and avoid the risks of issuing or responding to rapid reactions and proper coordination on crisis management – as it was the case in the Franco-German collaboration in the EUFOR RD Congo. Another factor that contributed to internal tensions, frictions, and operational ineffectiveness was the high level of multinationality of these operations. Even though, multinationality increase the legitimacy of the missions, it also increases the chances that at least some countries will come with national restrictions on the tasks they are allowed to carry out and will delay and hinder the operations even more.

Collective amnesia

Finally, and with great emphasis, it is time for the EU to put in place serious arrangements for learning from past experiences – robust assessment of what worked and what did not in each operation, and systematic follow-up to fix the persistent problems. At the beginning of each operation there is somehow a “collective amnesia” of the lessons learned and the embarrassing moments these missions had to go through. It seems that the EU tends to forget the “*genois*” delays in the Chad mission when EU military planners could not find enough transport capabilities and Russia ended up lending four helicopters and 120 personnel to EUFOR.³⁹ Or when it took the EU two weeks to close a gap in EUFOR's medical team: two surgeons were needed. Even worse, the various shortcomings culminated with India's offer to supply the EU with fighting camels to serve as a substitute for the lack of helicopters. Amateur improvisations cannot be seen as a substitute to real professionalism, and thus it is imperative the EU is capable to digest and learn its past experiences. Moreover, without concrete steps by the Member States to modernize their militaries, the 200 billion euros⁴⁰ that the Union spends on defense each year are simply meaningless.

The limited successes of the EU missions in Africa are not only due to the efforts of the troops to follow their mandate, but also thanks to good luck, ingenuity on the part of many individuals who have found ways to work the unworkable, and a collective readiness to bring safety and stability to the zones in conflict. The problems listed above are real impediments for the

³⁹ Ehrhart H.G., *Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR*, European Security Review no 42, December 2008, p. 2.

<http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_231_esr42-euforchad.pdf>

⁴⁰ Witney N., *Re-energizing Europe's Security and Defense Policy*, Policy Paper, The European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2008, p. 1.

performance of the EU crisis management and, it is essential that, if the EU truly wishes to move beyond rehearsals towards a more serious role in the maintenance of global security, it will have to rethink what it can really do and maybe leave aside the great ambition of becoming a leader in the maintenance of global security, at least for the time being. However, and on a positive note, the Irish “Yes” vote to the Lisbon Treaty has opened up a new period of hope about the prospects of the EU’s institutional reforms and a re-launch of the ESPD and “l’Europe de la Défense” where the idea of a “multi-speed Union” in crisis management can finally move away from a merely hypothetical initiative.

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